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Abstract: Due to their technical and rather specialist nature, standards are often overlooked as a form of influence over 
third states, yet they form an important and expanding role in the emerging global legal order. Usually developed outside 
of formal legal processes, regulatory standards nevertheless have hard impacts upon national and international legal 
frameworks. This paper examines the EU’s advancement of its regulatory agenda: producing global and domestic legal 
standards that are diffused to third states through multiple channels of communication. Using New Zealand as a case 
study, this paper draws on research to examine the success of extending the EU’s standards beyond its borders. While 
the extent to which adoption of EU standards by New Zealand has been varied, there is clear evidence that Europe’s 
regulatory reach extends far beyond its borders. The colloquialism “she’ll be right” gives a flavour of New Zealand’s 
approach to the adoption of EU standards in many contexts. 
 




Within wider literature on international organisations shaping third states’ domestic policy, 
there is a growing body of work featuring the European Union (EU)’s diffusion of normative 
values.1 Diffusion is used to explain the EU’s normative power promotion: influence over 
third states’ laws is seen empirically in the way the EU widely spreads standards and 
regulation policy externally. The extent to which the EU has influenced third states’ norms 
can sometimes seem difficult to quantify; the influence of standards can be difficult to track. 
Legal influence is not often cited as a normative power mechanism; however, it is occurring 
globally, as many economic and political actors establish rules through law. Orbie suggested 
the EU’s influence on labour standards created a ‘regulatory Europe’, alongside the 
‘normative power Europe’ that is often discussed in EU literature. 2 It is this regulatory 
Europe that this paper discusses through regulatory product standards. In focussing on EU 
standards and how they have influenced New Zealand (NZ) standards, there is tangible 
evidence that the EU has strong legal influence on small third states.  
 
This paper examines the relevance of diffusion literature to the case study of NZ acquisition 
of EU standards, and the channels of communication by which this occurs: market 
communication, a power struggle between global actors for influence in different ways, and 
                                                          
1 K. Linos, 'Diffusion through Democracy,' American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 3, 2011. 
2 J. Orbie, 'Promoting Labour Standards Through Trade: Normative Power or Regulatory Power,' R. G. Whitman (ed.), in 
Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, New 
York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2011. 




Europe’s strength in information and expertise. The common NZ idiom “she’ll be right” 
seems to describe the attitude NZ takes to adopting EU standards: because a bigger and 
more experienced partner has applied these standards, they will be acceptable to the NZ 




Standards have long been a part of the EU’s global promotion of norms: Bangemann, the 
European Commissioner for Industrial Affairs in the 1990s, illustrated this when his 
working group stated the EU should create a global framework for regulation.4 He also 
stated that the European Community “must assume a leading role in developing 
international standards,” showing that encouraging global legal influence is important for 
the EU, and has been for over a decade.5 In fact, one of the initial raisons d’être of the EU 
has been standardisation: when the EU formed, standards harmonisation was crucial for 
newly integrating countries connected through coal and steel, as they required standardised 
trade mechanisms, and railroads in particular.  The EU’s regulatory agenda has proved 
successful, as the CEO of General Electric stated: “almost ninety-nine per cent of regulation 
will come from the EU over time.”6  
 
Different stages of EU growth have added complexity to the EU’s normative role as a 
standards producer: diffusion theory accounts for many mechanisms of standards 
promotion because it allows for innovation to be spread through multiple mechanisms 
within a social system. The mechanisms within diffusion are forthwith defined as ‘channels 
of communication.’7 EU standards have diffused to smaller third states: this article examines 
how this has occurred in New Zealand, through the diffusion channels of market 
communication, European information and expertise. It also accounts for the efforts Europe 
is taking in standards creation as part of the legal power struggle between global powers. 
 
Standards apply to most areas of the production and consumption of everyday products, 
including food, health and safety, and technology. Standards are important factors of 
sovereign regulation as they encompass citizens’ everyday life; therefore, standards agenda-
setting is a significant part of any state’s power through global normative and legal influence. 
A standard in this context is defined as a “document approved by a recogni[s]ed body, that 
provides for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or 
related processes and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may 
also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling 
requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method.”8 NZ standards are 
usually directed by issue-specific agencies:9 producers and professionals using products 
have to adhere to these standards, but they are often not legislated. Regulatory standard 
influence herewith examined, is the “the ability of a jurisdiction to define and implement a 
                                                          
3 A loose translation for “she’ll be right” is “everything will be okay.” 
4 High Level Group on the Information Society (1994) Recommendations to the European Council: Europe and the Global 
Information Society sourced from <http://vecam.org/IMG/pdf/bangemann.pdf> accessed 7 September 2014 
5  M. Bangemann, There is no alternative to a European Federal State, 1993, European Commission, sourced from 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-93-98_en.htm> accessed 7 September 2014. 
6 F. A. Manuele, 'Global Harmonization of Safety Standards,' Professional Safety Vol. 50, No. 11, 2005, p. 1. 
7 E. M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, New York, Free Press, 1983, p. 5. 
8 World Trade Organisation, 'Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (WTO) 1868 UNTS 120,' (1994). Annex 1 (Terms 
and their Definitions for the Purpose of this Agreement). 
9 The main examples used in this paper are Medsafe, Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ), and Occupational 
Health and Safety. 




set of market rules and to monitor firms’ compliance with them.”10 This delimits intellectual 
property issues. De facto standards are adopted by third states, signalling the legal influence 
regulatory Europe has internationally.  
 
Harmonisation is a method of creating compatibility between countries in standards, either 
specifically, or by closely approximating a standard, and is either accomplished through law 
(de jure) or adopted and recognised (de facto). De jure harmonisation is often through 
international standards treaties, or legal standards decided upon and implemented into 
legislation. The food standards agreed by Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) 
is a good example of this. It is difficult to track the influences larger actors have upon 
standards in third states that are de jure, as the standards are established and recognised as 
the third country’s, within their own law. De facto harmonisation of standards through the 
adoption of another states’ standards may be the copying of external standards directly, 
adjusting external standards to meet local requirements, or although not specifically 
acknowledging a standard, local producers nonetheless meet the external standard.  
 
De facto harmonisation happens via the diffusion of standards to third states, through 
multiple channels of communication: often the channel of communication will determine 
how de facto harmonisation takes place locally. The impact of EU influence is seen more 
vividly in de facto harmonisation of standards; influence by proxy is evidence of significant 
underlying influence. This article, while including some EU standards that are written into 
NZ legislation, principally examines EU de facto standards harmonisation and 
demonstrates the extent of the EU’s underlying influence. 
   
This article examines the empirical evidence of EU influence from an objective standpoint 
and does not make recommendations that NZ should or should not use EU standards. 
However, it is of interest that not all standards have had a beneficial outcome for NZ. NZ 
does not regulate medical devices, but instead relies on foreign regulators to determine 
whether a device is able to be used: a 2012 investigation showed flaws within the system the 
EU uses to approve medical devices such as hip implants.11 The investigation caused EU-
regulated hip implants in NZ to be recalled. This highlights the problems of reliance for small 
states.  Transplanted standards may not be specific to NZ conditions, or may be aimed at 
supporting manufacturers rather than consumers of the product. An investigation into 
whether smaller countries are following European standards because they are better, or just 
that they are perceived as better by smaller third countries is an area for future research.  
 
Models of Diffusion 
 
Börzel has noted many examples of diffusion from the EU to a variety of areas, including 
towards potential Member States and third states. 12  The literature suggests main four 
mechanisms of EU influence: influencing importers through EU directives, encouraging 
producers and manufacturers to comply with the EU directives to maintain trading; 
enforcing international standards of compliance through multilateral partnerships; 
conditionality, and incentives for enlargement; and third states using EU standards to solve 
                                                          
10  D. Bach and L. N. Abraham, 'Governing lipitor and lipstick: Capacity, sequencing, and power in international 
pharmaceutical and cosmetics regulation,' Review of International Political Economy: RIPE, Vol.17, No. 4, 2010, p. 1. 
11  Radio New Zealand, 'Hip implant probes sparks call for better NZ standards,' Radio New Zealand, 
<http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/119160/hip-implant-probe-sparks-call-for-better-nz-system>accessed  7 
January 2013.  
12 T. A. Borzel and T. Risse, 'From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction,' West European Politics, Vol. 35, No. 1, 
2012.  




domestic problems. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier suggest three similar models based on 
diffusion theory to explain the institutionalisation of EU regulatory standards in non-
Member States.13 Their first model is known as ‘rationalist bargaining power,’ where the EU 
“sets its rules as conditions [that third states] have to fulfill in order to receive EU rewards;” 
in other words, the ability to set standards conditions within other agreements provides the 
EU with power in the negotiating process if their incentives are credible.14 Third countries 
will do a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the EU incentives are greater than the 
cost of adopting EU standards.15  
 
The second model is the ‘social learning model’, where states are incentivised by values and 
norms: the EU justifies its existence with a collective identity of common values and norms 
that create rules, which gain legitimacy as more states and groups are party to those rules.16 
Third countries are likely to become party to these rules if they resonate with their own 
existing standards. The well-known model of conditionality is in play here: EU candidate 
states have to implement European standards bodies’ guidelines, a process which 
legititmises European standards.17  
 
The third model, the ‘lesson drawing model,’ is the most pertinent when examining NZ 
acquisition of EU standards, as NZ is not seeking to become part of the EU community 
through conditionality or identity.  The lesson drawing model describes how third states 
acquire regulatory standards with neither incentives nor persuasion. This model is usually 
expressed when a state is dissatisfied with the incumbent domestic regulatory standards, 
and expects another state’s standard to effectively deal with the policy causing 
dissatisfaction.18 The lesson drawing model may explain why third states undertake some 
EU regulatory standards in their own legislation, but not others, and also how their 
interpretation may differ to that of the EU. Börzel has legitimised why the EU promotes EU 
values though diffusion: rationality and cost-benefit analysis, normative reasoning, and 
providing a validity of norms to states that may challenge particular norms and values.19 
While Börzel’s examination of the situation may explain the EU’s reasons for direct influence 
on agenda-setting in the legal realm, this paper specifically analyses the outcome of the 
influence. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier explain the reasoning behind third states 
adopting EU norms and standards, whereas diffusion theory discusses the channels of 
communication by which norms influence third states. 20  It is these channels of 
communication that are further applied to the NZ acquisition of EU standards. 
 
Before analysing why different channels of communication have led to a stronger EU 
influence on third states’ standards, it must be acknowledged that some standards are 
internationally recognised. Often NZ and the EU align in standards because global issues 
require harmonisation. For example, electromagnetic compatibility affects all products that 
use electricity (such as electric drills, televisions and garage door openers), despite voltage 
differences across countries. Because electromagnetic radiation generated by these products 
may affect other users, electromagnetic compatibility standards are parallel in many states.21 
                                                          
13 F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, 'Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe,' Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2004. 
14 Ibid., p. 671. 
15 Ibid., p. 671. 
16 Ibid. 
17 'EU uses standards to increase market influence: 5 Edition.' 
18 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, op. cit., p. 676. 
19 Borzel and Risse, op. cit.  
20 Ibid. 
21  Roland Gubisch, The Engineer's Guide to Global EMC Requirements: 2007 Edition, sourced from 
<http://www.ieee.li/pdf/essay/guide_to_global_emc_requirements_2007.pdf> accessed 7 September 2014 




A global standard in this case means aligning with the EU (or any state) is not only a logical 
response for third countries, it is a necessity. International Standards Organisation (ISO) 
standards are recognised by 114 states. For the EU to have influenced ISO standards 
provides legitimacy to EU standards. It would be a point for significant future research to 
see how European standards have been incorporated or turned into ISO standards, 
reflecting the EU’s legal influence globally. Some examples of European standards becoming 
ISO standards, and by proxy, NZ standards are EN1050 (risk assessment for machinery) 
which became ISO14120 in 1999, and EN292 (machinery safety) became ISO12100-1 and 
ISO12100-2 in 2003.22 
 
The following diffused channels of communication of EU legal influence have been seen in 
a preliminary mapping exercise undertaken in 2012: market cooperation, global legal power 
promotion through creation or stronger implementation of standards, and European 




The EU utilises its single common market power in many external activities, including the 
diffusion of standards, a process referred to as ‘market communication.’ The EU has a large 
influence on third states through market communication due to its large global market share 
for many products and services. The obvious global influence the EU has in standardisation 
is the Conformité Européene (CE) marking, which is required on products sold in the EU. 
This allows the exporting state to judge if the product meets EU standards before export.23 
EU standards are thus important to NZ for market retention: the EU ranked as NZ’s third 
largest trading partner (after Australia and China).24   
 
The EU and NZ have a Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) on standards, so NZ 
companies have competency to put the CE marking on products if they meet European 
standards. As products are made for international markets, NZ exporters understand that 
they have to meet the standards of large markets to access them and profit from their 
product. Therefore, exporters conform to various internationally-recognised standards. This 
is particularly true for NZ dairy exporters meeting EU standards in their products, 
regardless of NZ standards.25  
 
A prime example of NZ voluntarily adopting standards to comply with the EU standards is 
wine production. European influence on the international wine market is significant, and as 
a result, NZ deems its Overseas Market Export Requirements as complying with EC 
regulation 479/2008.26  While compliance in this area seems thorough, when EC regulation 
203/2012 was introduced (involving the production of organic wine), the NZ-EU MRA did 
not cover labeling wine as ‘organic,’ causing difficulties for NZ organic wine producers and 
                                                          
22 Manuele, op. cit., p. 42. 
23  European Commission, 'Trade: New Zealand,'  <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-
relations/countries/new-zealand/>, accessed 9 December 2012. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Dairy NZ, 'Strategy for New Zealand Dairy Farming 2009/2010,' Hamilton, Dairy NZ, 2009. 
26 Ministry for Primary Industries, 'Overseas Market Export Requirements (OMARs) for wine,' New Zealand Government, 
<http://www.foodsafety.govt.nz/industry/sectors/wine/exporting/grape/market-access.htm>, accessed 9 December 
2012. 
European Council, 'The common organisation of the market in wine, amending Regulations (EC) No 1493/1999, (EC) No 
1782/2003, (EC) No 1290/2005 and repealing Regulations (EEC) No 2392/86 and (EC) No 1493/1999,' in Council 
Regulation (EC) No 479/2008, European Union (ed.), Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union, 2008. 




exporters. NZ’s organic certification agency expects these regulations to be upgraded for the 
2014 export year.27  
 
A second example of EU market communication of standards also comes from  the wine 
industry. NZ has structures in place for laboratory testing of wine, despite the EU being the 
only wine market to require laboratory testing, showing the importance of the EU wine 
market to NZ producers.28 NZ certification agencies changing their standards to comply with 
new EU standards demonstrates the influence access to the European market has on small 
third state standards.  
 
Thirdly, NZ wine producers are more likely to comply with more stringent EU standards to 
be able to retain their market access: for example, NZ producers follow EU standards 
requiring them to use 100% of the stated grape variety, rather than NZ law which only 
requires 85% of the stated grape variety.29 This complements claims that stricter standards 
creates compliance and therefore influence by those that set the standards, such as the EU.  
 
A fourth example shows that for the same reasons, NZ wine growers also comply with the 
EU standard on wine-labeling, requiring NZ wine labels to include mandatory information 
in one field of vision, and be written in British English.30  
 
While standardisation can be as overt as setting product standards to allow market entry, 
more normative standards (such as the spelling of everyday words) can also be enforced by 
large markets on smaller, dependent markets. NZ has taken a “she’ll be right” attitude in all 
of these examples, and adopted Europe’s standards due to their immense market influence.  
 
As previously mentioned, NZ has a common standards agency with Australia, FSANZ. 
However, large EU market pressure has also influenced NZ’s decision to ignore FSANZ 
standards. For instance, to retain European market access, NZ declined the FSANZ standard 
to change labeling on olive oil and olive-pomace oil, as it would deter Mediterranean 
imports, which make up 95% of NZ olive oil sales.31 While a larger market like Australia 
could feasibly enforce such a standard, the same standard would create barriers to NZ 
trade.32 NZ’s market dependence on larger more powerful markets can be seen here: the EU 
is an important market for NZ (particularly in olive oil), and so in special cases, influences 
standards more than NZ’s most important trader: a state with whom NZ shares a standards 
agency.  
 
While the influence of the EU as a market is still strong currently, as emerging markets such 
as China grow powerful, the influence that they have on standards in export-dependant 
states, such as NZ, should be carefully noted by those watching the impact of law on global 
normative power.  
 
                                                          
27  N. Leneneu and J. White, 'Guide for Wine labelling, ingredients and market access,' BioGro, 
<http://www.biogro.co.nz/mm_uploads/Wine_notification_No1_21_11_12_ver4.pdf>, accessed  9 December 2012. 
28 New Zealand Food Safety Authority, 'New Zealand Grape Wine Export Code,' Wellington, New Zealand: New Zealand 
Food Safety Authority, 2006. 
29  Wine of the Week, 'About New Zealand Wine, with Statistics,' Wine of the Week, 
<http://www.wineoftheweek.com/regions/aboutnz.html>, accessed 9 December 2012. 
30 New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, 'Exporter Guide: Wine in the United Kingdom: Market Profile,' op. cit.  
31  C. Cord, 'New Zealand Says "No Thanks" to New Olive Oil Standards,' Olive Oil Times, 
<http://www.oliveoiltimes.com/olive-oil-business/australia-and-new-zealand/new-zealand-no-new-olive-oil-
standards/18547>, accessed 9 December 2012. 
32 Ibid. 




Global Power Struggle 
  
As in politics and economics, there is an ongoing power struggle between leading actors in 
legal structures. Bach and Newman observed that the motives have changed for those who 
create standards: “the form of governance has shifted from occasional international spill-
over of domestic rules to first deliberate extraterritorial imposition of domestic laws and 
subsequently to transgovernmental cooperation aimed at policy harmonization.” 33 
Eeckhout claimed the Lisbon Treaty allowed EU law to make a “competence creep” in 
expanding its reach and scope in many areas.34 External actors have noticed this competence 
creep: the US was formerly the leader in standard creation, now the EU is showing 
leadership in this area.35 The Lisbon Treaty gave the EU extra competences, which combined 
with a stronger market access and technical expertise has led the EU to having a stronger 
control of global market forces and standardisation. 36  The distinctiveness between 
American and European legal systems is well-known, and the competition between these 
global leaders in standards provides an empirical explanation of this ongoing power 
struggle.  
 
 The power struggle currently is mainly between the US and the EU. Despite China emerging 
as a political and economic power, it has yet to emerge as a legal leader in the regulatory 
standards field. China may be unable to be a leader in international standards creation due 
to the fact that the EU and US have created many standards first, requiring China to adopt 
these standards. It has been claimed that China will become a dominant regulatory 
standards creator in the next decade.37 Standards creators on all sides of the global power 
struggle, continue to create standards in the knowledge they will be adopted easily by third 
states. 
 
Meanwhile, the US and EU are diffusing standards onto third states, such as NZ. It is said 
that if the two major global actors (EU and US) agree on a standard, it becomes the de facto 
global standard, because smaller markets have to abide by the rules of the market leaders; 
whereas if they disagree, the market is stuck with rival regulatory standards and smaller 
states are faced with a choice. 38  In keeping with this concept, much of the literature 
surrounding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations suggests the 
proposed trading relationship between the US and the EU will determine standards that 
China has to follow to retain market access in many areas.39 This is an area to keep following. 
 
It seems that the regulatory standards influencer ‘wins’ the power struggle because the ‘loser’ 
is not a strong enforcer of standards and is not always the first to produce standards in that 
area. The US has ‘won’ the global power struggle for standards when the EU has not been 
clear and coherent in its own standards. This has resulted in third states adopting US 
sta.ndards or creating their own. Smaller states are more likely to adopt the EU’s standards 
if one standard is available for all of Europe (part of the proposed ‘Kissinger Effect’).40 This 
is particularly true for food standards, where NZ and Australia developed FSANZ due to a 
lack of leadership and coherence from the EU. Early in the EU’s standard creation role, many 
EU Member States did not agree on standardisation for food products and food safety and 
                                                          
33 Ibid., p. 1. 
34 P. Eeckhout, 'The growing influence of European Union law,' Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 5, 2010. 
35 Bach and Abraham, op. cit. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Panel discussion at European Union Studies Association Asia Pacific Conference, 17-18th May, 2013. 
38 Bach and Abraham, op. cit. 
39 C. James, “Europe, the forgotten continent,” Otago Daily Times, November 12th 2013. 
40 Ibid. 




created their own moratoriums and rules: without coherence, the EU did not become a 
global leader in this area. 41  Slowly, as larger food safety scares have occurred (Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy and Avian Flu), the EU’s competence has grown with united 
EU directives on food regulations affecting the entire single market. Because the EU was a 
latecomer, EU food product and safety regulations are not globally accepted, whereas the 
US’s Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has become a respected body due to their long-
standing coherent standards.42  A weak model from the EU on food product standards has 
shown that coherence and unity is essential to becoming a global standards leader. 
 
To be a standards leader, a state has to have both the credibility (often gained by market 
power) and an enforced set of regulations that are more thorough than another state’s 
standard. The US has a strong regulatory body for pharmaceuticals, the FDA. International 
pharmaceutical producers often take the view that if their products satisfy the FDA, they are 
able to satisfy requirements by less strict countries.43 Industry observers suggest that if the 
FDA takes on European-influenced ISO standards as aforementioned, the FDA will lose 
their power in creating and maintaining global influence over standards.44  In 1997 the EU 
and US signed an MRA, sharing pharmaceutical certifications and findings, to eliminate 
overseas inspections. The US failed to adequately certify exports and research, meaning that 
the EU was regulating both their own pharmaceutical companies and US companies, giving 
the EU larger influence over global pharmaceutical standards. EU domestic audits are said 
to be more thorough in this area and harder to pass than US audits.45  
 
In the area of cosmetics the EU is the standard agenda-setter, because the US did not have 
sufficiently detailed or thorough standards.46 By way of example, in recent changes to NZ 
cosmetics standards, the proposed standards recognised and substantially copied wording 
from the EU Cosmetic Regulation Art. 19, under the presumption that “NZ considers 
changes in regulatory requirements of other major markets for adoption in their own 
jurisdictions,” even if there is no global agreement on these standards, such as an ISO 
standard. 47 Part of this adoption is due to similarities in definitions: NZ tends to adopt EU 
cosmetics standards because both the EU and NZ define sunscreen as a cosmetic, whereas 
the US and Canada define sunscreen as a medicine, and Australia defines sunscreen as both 
a medicine and a cosmetic under different circumstances.48 Therefore, smaller actors such 
as NZ are more likely to follow EU standards in pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, because US 
standards were not imposed as strictly on the global market and were not accurate or 
harmonised enough to have market credibility.  
 
Standards leaders are those who create standards before any other state or organisation does 
so. The first standard to be developed embeds the local market. This is particularly crucial 
for the EU in toy safety standards, which NZ has adopted. The EU has taken a leading role 
in toy safety standards, introducing a new directive banning carcinogens in toys that are 
                                                          
41 S. Milmo, 'European food safety faces regulatory reform,' Chemical Market Reporter, Vol. 259, No. 26, 2001. 
42 Ibid. 
43 D. Hairston, 'Hunting for Harmony in Pharmaceutical Standards: Common standards would reduce the cost of getting 
pharmaceuticals to market,' Chemical Engineering, Vol.104, No. 20, 1997. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Bach and Abraham, op. cit. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Johnson & Johnson NZ Ltd, 'Johnson & Johnson NZ Ltd Interest,' New Zealand Environmental Protection Authority, 
2012, p. 1. 
48 Ibid. 




harmful to children.49 NZ took this change to the directive very seriously, seeking to “align 
AS/NZS Standards with International and European Standards,” within an ongoing 
project.50 When NZ manufacturers produce toys for the European market, they now must 
establish an EC Declaration of Conformity.51 The EU toy safety directive was launched in 
2011 to ensure safe toys for EU consumers. 52 This influenced big brands who sell to Europe, 
many of whom are based in China: this in turn forced Chinese exporters to update their 
safety and risk assessment procedures for the continuation of toy sales to the EU.53 To retain 
market access, NZ has followed European requirements. This is a clear instance of they way 
that  the EU is able to enforce standards by virtue of being a strong market. By pioneering 
toy safety standards, the EU has become the leading standard creator in toy safety. 
 
The EU and US are currently standards agenda-setters through credible markets, stronger 
application of standards, and being the initial standard creator in an area. Smaller states 
such as NZ are adopting these standards to retain access to the market, without question, in 
a “she’ll be right” kind of way. 
 
European Information and Expertise 
 
As a large economy, made up of many Member States, the EU has considerable bureaucratic 
and research competence. It is this information and expertise that has led the EU to become 
a standards leader. Smaller states such as NZ borrow from this expertise, as they do not have 
sufficient financial or personnel resources. In true “she’ll be right” fashion, NZ copies the 
standards. As a small nation, NZ does not have full facilities to do so. There are two main 
explanations for this phenomenon. 
 
Firstly, the ability for European standards to be adopted entirely (word for word), is likely 
to be due to the transparency of EU decision-making: background information is readily 
available, and the EU institutions justify their arguments for a standard to become 
legislation to lobby groups, Member States and other EU institutions. Many third states use 
EU transparency and information to have a greater comprehension of the standard. The New 
Zealand Building Code was changed to include the European standard EN14604, which 
allows certain types of fire safety devices to be used in New Zealand buildings, was copied 
almost exactly from an EU standard, and gave the same justification.54  
 
When a standard is adopted in NZ which creates controversy, the competent authority 
(depending on the matter) often uses EU rulings to provide more information for producers 
or consumers in New Zealand. Due to the credibility of EU expertise, NZ often uses EU 
rulings to justify adoption. In the case of food colourings, FSANZ requires producers to 
undertake a safety assessment before being used in food products; however, FSANZ backs 
this ruling up with evidence from the European Food Safety Authority, who published six 
                                                          
49  Standards New Zealand, 'Draft Standards on toy safety available now for public comment,'  
<http://www.standards.co.nz/news/Media+archive/July+-+Sept+07/Toys+and+safety.htm>, accessed  9 December 
2012. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Standards New Zealand, 'European Toy Safety Directive Changes For First Time in 20 Years and a New BS Toy Standard 
Published,'  
<http://www.standards.co.nz/touchstone/Issue+30/Consumer+Safety/European+toy+safety+directive+changes+for+fi
rst+time+in+20+years+and+a+new+BS+toy+Standard+published.htm>, accessed 9 December 2012. 
52 SGS-CSTC Standards Technical, 'China Takes Toy Safety Standards Seriously - Interview with SGS's Toy Business 
Director in China,' SGS, <http://www.sgs.com/en/Our-Company/News-and-Media-Center/News-and-Press-
Releases/2012/09/China-Takes-Toy-Safety-Seriously.aspx>, accessed 24 November 2012. 
53 Ibid.  
54 Cavius, 'CAVIUS Latest News,'  <http://www.cavius.co.nz/category/latest-news/>, accessed 9 December 2012. 




opinions on based on scientific evidence done in the EU.55 FSANZ notes that the EU requires 
some colours to have warnings on them, as food colouring has been thought to cause 
hyperactivity in children.56 NZ may not have the resources to afford duplicate this research, 
despite local expertise being strong under a shared standards agency.  
 
Secondly, the EU creates ready-made solutions for NZ to adopt (a classic example of the 
‘lesson drawing model’). In comparison to other decision-makers, EU decision-making is 
accompanied by very detailed and justified legal discourse, which is available on the 
Internet. While a large bureaucracy can sometimes mean slow decision-making, its 
standards come with legal assurance. Ready-made justifications create ‘instant’ standards 
acceptable to third states, who justify these standards to their constituents with 
predetermined EU arguments. It is also notable that Medsafe seeks to comply with EU 
standards when updating the Code of Good Manufacturing Practise for Manufacture and 
Distribution of Therapeutic Goods.57 
 
By 28 Member States having to follow the same standards under the acquis communitaire, 
more legitimacy is given to European standards as international standards.58 NZ then tends 
to follow European decisions in their pharmaceutical standards: NZ withdrew medicines 
with dextropropoxyphene in them after the EU and Singapore withdrew the medicines.59 
Similarly, after bufexamac-based medicines (for dermatitis) were banned in Europe, a 
review was undertaken in NZ. 60 Medsafe then revoked consent to sell bufexamax-based 
products in NZ based on scientific studies in NZ and in Europe showing both inefficacy and 
harm.61 For many medicines, overseas testing by some agencies is appropriate (including 
European Medicines Agency) and is then accepted in NZ, as illustrated in the case of 
inadequate hip implant standards. This reliance on other parties to create standards and 
assess products without NZ input not only shows the level of confidence NZ has in European 
standards and the pitfalls of a “she’ll be right” attitude, but also the strong global legal 
influence the EU has on smaller third states.  
Conclusion 
 
Empirical evidence shows the EU has been a significant regulator by proxy in NZ through 
diffusing standards through many channels of communications. There are many 
simultaneous factors that should be considered when explaining why small countries rely on 
European standards and many of the channels of communication suggested are intertwined 
in reality. The EU as a global market power has been influential in standard adoption by NZ, 
as it seeks to retain market access to the EU, particularly in its strong trading items such as 
wine and olive oil. The EU and the US are currently in a power struggle over standards, 
                                                          
55  Food Standards Australia New Zealand, 'Food Colours,' Food Standards Australia New Zealand, 
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58 P. L. Willert, 'Assessment of the pharmaceutical market in Poland after accession to the European Union,' The European 
Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2007. 
59  Medsafe, 'Paradex and Capadex will be withdrawn from New Zealand market on 1 August 2010,' New Zealand 
Government, <http://www.medsafe.govt.nz/hot/media/2010/paradexandcapadexmarch2010.asp>, accessed  9 
December 2012. 
60 Medsafe, 'Summary of data on the benefits and risks for bufexamac-containing medicines indicated for the relief of 
dermatitis, rash and hives,'  <http://www.medsafe.govt.nz/profs/adverse/Minutes145Bufexamacattachment.pdf>, 
accessed  9 December 2012. 
61 Ibid. 




where the ‘winners’ are the stronger regulators, the first to write standards, and have market 
credibility.  
 
To create credibility and respect for EU standards, the EU created an information and 
expertise-based approach to standards, where the standard has to be justified to all member-
states. Creating an individual justification for a standard can be expensive and difficult for 
small states such as NZ; therefore, the adoption of EU standards by NZ is attractive and 
contributes to de facto standards harmonisation. Among Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s 
three main models, NZ’s “she’ll be right” approach to standards seems to best fit their lesson 
drawing model, as NZ takes on global leaders’ standards when their own standards are 
dissatisfactory: as in the case of olive oil. The lesson drawing model has explained why third 
states would take on EU standards, by diffusion and the channels of communication that 
diffusion utilises theoretically explains why the EU has provided these standards for third 
states to draw upon the lessons of. The NZ context offers validity to both the ‘lesson drawing 
model’ and diffusion theory when discussing regulatory standards and the way EU standards 
influence third states’ law.  
 
While this study is empirical and uses examples to state what is seen in NZ currently with 
the “she’ll be right” attitude, it is likely that these channels of communications will continue 
to be seen, no matter who the standards leader is. There are many fields of research to draw 
on from this preliminary mapping exercise: the EU’s institutional influence on ISO 
standards, creating a larger sample of dependent economies and third states, and the de jure 
influence the EU has on third states’ standards. While regulatory Europe seems prominent 
currently, the emergence of China as a global power over the next decade will be vital to 
watch, to understand the role of diffusing standards by global normative powers.  
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